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1 Introduction
Fighting poverty is an enduring task even in affluent postindustrial societies. What
is more, the image of the poor is often ethnicized which makes the designing of
public poverty assistance programs not only an economic policy question, but a
politically sensitive challenge as well. A number of studies concluding that the
stigma on poverty would be stronger where low status was identified with some
ethnic minority groups (Gilens, 1999; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) have attracted
considerable attention in the past decade.
However, the ’heterogeneity kills solidarity’ thesis has also been subject to
strong critique (e.g. Albrekt-Larsen, 2006); and cross-country investigations of
attitudes and actual spending provide mixed evidence (e.g. Soroka et al., 2006;
Finseraas, 2009; Dahlberg et al., 2012).
In this paper, we shed light on a possible mechanism that could partly account
for the complex relationship between ethnic heterogeneity, image of the poor and
public support for poverty assistance. We draw on psychological theories regarding
poverty attributions and stereotypes in order to explore the interplay of perceived
poverty and ethnic prejudice in the process of forming judgments on welfare
recipients. Our model could support the conjecture that taxpayers’ judgments on
the very poor (as opposed to the moderately poor) are particularly prone to the
influence of (ethnic) stereotypes.
In the next section, we contrast the popular ’ethnic preferences’ model with
a more nuanced view on the mechanisms leading to the ethnicization of welfare
preferences. We introduce our model of preferences on poverty assistance in
Section 3. This model relies on deservingness as a key concept in the taxpayer’s
mind, and incorporates the concept of stereotype as a prior belief relating to
deservingness. It also assumes that a welfare recipient’s socioeconomic status
does not only bear implications regarding the extent of material needs, but also
sends noisy information about his/her deservingness. Some crucial implications
of the model are presented in Section 4. In particular, we show that the influence
of stereotypes on welfare preferences tends to diminish as the status of a potential
recipient approaches middle-class standards. Section 5 shortly addresses the
possible lessons learned from our model.
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2 Ethnicization of Welfare Preferences
Freeman (1986) and Weede (1986) warned already early on in the 1980s that
the popularity of the welfare system may deteriorate in societies where poverty
is ethnicized. More recently, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) has explored this idea
in more depth. Arguments based on ethnic preferences may easily be employed
to take account of the evidence on the ethnicization of welfare attitudes. Ethnic
preferences imply a desire to discriminate among ethnic groups. In other words,
individuals give larger weight to the wealth of their own ethnic group members than
that of needy people belonging to other groups. Such assumptions have been used
in several political economy models and empirical analyses of welfare preferences
(e.g Luttmer, 2001; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Lindqvist and Ostling, 2013).
However, Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) provocative hypothesis regarding the
coming era of welfare state retrenchment following mass immigration in Europe
has been subject to strong critique; and some scholars have questioned whether
heterogeneity kills solidarity in any institutional setting (Taylor-Gooby, 2006;
Albrekt-Larsen, 2006; Albrekt-Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013). In fact, the results
of expanding the ’heterogeneity kills solidarity’ hypothesis to a wider variety of
welfare regimes seem to be mixed. The findings of Dahlberg et al. (2012) have
supported Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) analysis. A series of other empirical
studies, on the other hand, have not (e.g. Finseraas, 2009; Mau and Burkhardt,
2009; Stichnoth and Straeten, 2009).
The ethnic preferences model, i.e. the simplest proposed underlying mechanism
supporting the hypothesis, has also been criticized. Habyarimana et al. (2007),
for instance, directly test the mechanisms that may undermine public good provi-
sion in ethnically heterogeneous communities. They reject the ethnic preference
hypothesis and suggest network based explanations instead.
The classical psychological theory of attributions also provides an alternative
to the ethnic preference model. This approach traces the ethnicization of welfare
preferences back to stereotypical beliefs about the personality traits of the poor.
In this framework, taxpayers are ready to support those whose poverty is a result
of bad luck but not a lack of efforts. Stereotypes about the work ethic of the
(perceived) target groups influence taxpayers’ judgments of responsibility. These
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judgments, in turn, determine what they see as deserved assistance. Empirical
evidence seems to support this approach. Questionnaire surveys show that when
individuals form opinions about poverty assistance, a primary concern is whether
welfare recipients deserve the benefits they receive (Iyengar, 1991; Cook and
Barrett, 1992; Gilens, 1999; Van Oorschot, 2000; Albrekt-Larsen, 2006; Petersen
et al., 2011). In particular, these surveys find that people’s perceptions of recipients’
effort to find work drive welfare opinions. For example, Gilens (1999) argues that
middle-class Americans would be ready to support the deserving poor, but the
media generates an impression that the majority of the poor is undeserving: it tends
to classify needy people as predominantly black who have long been stereotyped
as lazy. This urges many Americans to oppose public poverty assistance programs.
Note that a similar approach has already been present in economic research on
poverty assistance (Fong, 2001).
Our formal model draws on the above theoretical underpinnings. We incor-
porate one additional factor, however. We not only distinguish the poor from
the non-poor. Instead, our model treats the potential recipient’s socioeconomic
status as a continuous variable (c.f. Janky and Varga, 2013). We assume that the
degree of the beneficiary’s poverty is an important information for the benevolent
taxpayer. As the degree of poverty increases, so does the appropriate amount of
pecuniary assistance. But there is another side of the coin: a lack of economic
success inevitably raises doubts about the target person’s own efforts to escape
dependence on other people’s help. Those doubts increase as status decreases.
Stereotypes about the potential recipient’s personality also play a crucial role: they
can moderate the inferences taxpayers may draw from observing the recipient’s
status. Stereotypes are modelled as the taxpayer’s prior beliefs on the potential
recipient’s work ethic. These beliefs could be modified in light of the recipient’s
observed status.
Our model of preferences on poverty assistance follows Besley and Coate
(1992) (see also Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). They also assume that voters intend
to help distressed and deserving individuals but are uncertain about the recipients’
behavioral traits. In a companion paper, Janky and Varga (2013) introduce a model
which is fairly similar to the subsequent one. Nonetheless, that model does not
address the role of group-specific stereotypes.
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3 A poverty-assistance model
In this section, we develop a simple model of compassionate citizens’ prefer-
ences on the optimal level of compensation for a poor individual. In the model,
poverty assistance is based on the deservingness principle and we use observable
socioeconomic status as a noisy signal for effort. The model predicts that, due
to imperfect observation of the poor person’s actual opportunities and behavioral
traits, larger misfortune may lead to smaller compensation. We also show that the
level of poverty has an impact on the influence of prior stereotypes on the degree
of compensation.
Let us denote by N the set of adult individuals of a society in which members
are bound together by norms of solidarity. Citizens of this society adopt a naïve
model for understanding their fellow citizens’ varying economic performances.
They assume that the economic succes of an adult individual j ∈ N is a function
of personality traits and situational factors. Thus, w j = g(e j, f j), where w is a
measure of living standards, e j is the level of effort j has made to earn money, and
f j is the overall effect of fate or fortune.
Let us start with a simple model of the compassionate citizen’s (i) preferences
over poverty:
Ui =V (wi)+∑
j
Di j(w j,e j, f j) (1)
where Di j expresses i’s (dis)utility stemming from her observing of the distress
of misfortunate fellow citizens. In the subsequent analysis we concentrate on
the pure effects of social preferences, namely, Di j. In this way, we simplify our
analysis without altering our qualitative results.
Consider the citizen’s simple model of economic success which assumes that
current socioeconomic status is the sum of the effects of efforts and fortune, that
is w j = e j + f j (c.f. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Two types of individuals are
supposed to exist: lazy and diligent ones. Lazy people exert zero effort, diligent
ones exert high efforts. That is, e j = 0 or h, where h > 0. As f j accumulates all
the factors the taxpayer is ready to compensate j for, f is modeled as a continuous
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variable and its conditional distribution is: f | e = 0v N(0,1), f | e = hv N(0,r)
where 1 < r. By introducing r, we capture the interaction between effort and
fortune within the framework of a simple additive model (for a different solution,
see Janky and Varga, 2013) .
The compassionate citizen (she) cares about those whose living standards fall
below the average of the diligent citizens, and exert high effort. Observing a fellow
citizen, her (dis)utility function takes the following form:
Di j = 0 f or w j = h or e j = 0 , and
Di j = w j−h f or w j < h and e j = h
(2)
Social preferences imply a support for assistance that compensates a (relatively)
low status and diligent j for bad fortune: ci j = h−w j.
However, the compassionate citizen faces an observational problem. While an
individual’s socioeconomic status can be observed by fellow citizens, efforts and
fortune are private information. Any citizen’s decision regarding the optimal degree
of compensation is supported by a) her observation of the potential recipient’s
status, b) her stable beliefs in a specific model of income generation (based on the
above parameters), and c) her prior assumption regarding the recipient’s personality
(e j).
The benevolent citizen maximizes her social preference-based expected utility
by supporting a compensation ci j = (h−w j)Pr(e j = h | w j, pi j), where pi j is the
prior likelihood of j being diligent (i’s stereotype on j’s personality).1
4 Status, Stereotypes and Poverty Assistance
Similarly to the model presented by Janky and Varga (2013), our analysis highlights
the possibility that the stigmatizing effect of poverty could overwhelm the feelings
of solidarity induced by distress. We refer to this phenomenon as the ’poverty-
assistance paradox’. Our Proposition 1 delineates conditions under which this
kind of paradox may arise.
1 See A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for a detailed analysis of the optimal level of the compensation.
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Let us denote by ci j the optimal level of compensation.
Proposition 1 (Poverty-assistance paradox.) In the simple poverty-assistance
model, there always exists a small enough w j relative to h and low enough values
of p > 0 and r > 1 such that
∂c∗i j
∂w j
> 0 holds for all 0 < pi j < p < 1 and 1≤ r < r
. See appendix for the proof.
In other words, a negatively stereotyped poor person (values of pi j and w j are
low) faces a risk of losing (support for) transfers as he becomes even poorer, in
spite of the fact that the compassionate citizen’s social preferences would dictate
full compensation of the deserving poor people for any loss of income. What
is more, even the a priori better trusted individuals could experience the effect
of the poverty-assistance paradox should they become poor enough. Corollary 1
explicates this statement.
Corollary 1 In the simple poverty-compensation model, one can always find low
enough values w and r > 1, such that
∂c∗i j
∂w j
> 0 holds for all w j < w , 1≤ r < r and
0 < pi < 1. See appendix for the proof.
The poverty-assistance paradox stems from the signal low status sends about
the lack of efforts in a society in which citizens believe that luck plays only a minor
role in economic success (r is small). However, Proposition 1 and its corollary on
the poverty-assistance paradox do not tell us anything about the varying effects of
stereotypes.
As far as the role of stereotypes is concerned, it is easy to see that the amount
of preferred compensation c∗i j increases in pi j at any level of w j < h (see A.5 in
the Appendix). That is, the more the taxpayer trusts the poor recipient, the larger
transfer she is ready to allocate to him.
The question remains, however, of how the effect of prior stereotypes depends
on the recipient’s status? Previous research suggests that ambiguous information
reinforces the role of stereotypes in human decision making. A basic tenet of our
theory is that low status tends to be perceived as a noisy signal of laziness. On the
other hand, mid-level status may be a strong signal of deservingness. At certain
levels of the status hierarchy neither positive nor negative signals prevail. This type
of ambiguity lays the ground for stereotype-based judgments.
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Proposition 2 describes the conditions under which compassionate citizens
increasingly base their judgments about assistance on prior stereotypes (positive
and negative alike) as the recipients become poorer.
Proposition 2 (Positive poverty-stereotype interaction). In the simple poverty-
compensation model, there always exist a w< h close enough to h and high enough
values p< 1 and r, such that
∂c∗i j
∂w j∂ pi j
< 0 holds for all w<w j < h, 0< p< pi j < 1
and 1≤ r < r. See appendix for the proof.
The positive poverty-stereotype interaction means that the difference between
compensation of two equally poor, but differently stereotyped individuals increases
as they become poorer.
To sum up, while the poverty-assistance paradox stems from the strong negative
signal low status sends about personality, the positive poverty-stereotype interaction
is fostered by the lack of a strong positive signal in cases where one’s status is not
high enough.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a simple model of a compassionate citizen’s
(social) preferences on the optimal level of assistance for a poor individual. In the
model, poverty assistance is based on the deservingness principle; and the citizen
uses observable status as a noisy signal for effort. The model predicts that due
to imperfect observation of the poor person’s actual opportunities and behavioral
traits, larger misfortune may lead to smaller compensation (c.f. Janky and Varga,
2013).
The crucial implication of our model regards the variability of the influence of
stereotypes. This characteristic differentiates our approach from ethnic-preference
models. In particular, we have shown that the impact of negative stereotypes on
the preferred assistance may diminish as the target person’s status converges on
middle-class standards.
Questions remain, however, about the ranges of parameters and the levels of
socioeconomic status for which the positive interaction could emerge. Preliminary
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simulations suggest that under realistic parameter values, stereotypes tend to matter
more in judging those belonging to the poorest 1-3 percent than those around the
10th-15th percentile from below.
This tendency is in line with our recent empirical findings (Janky et al., 2014).
Based on a video-vignette experiment we investigated the influence of a potential
welfare recipient’s characteristics on the respondents’ preferences on poverty
assistance. The ethnic context played a minor role in shaping attitudes when hints
of moderate poverty were presented. In contrast, when facing reports on a severly
distressed community, subjects reacted strongly to ethnic cues. Nonetheless, the
experiment was not a direct test of our model.
Future research could address the parametrization of the model by extended
simulations and empirical validations. Moreover, a political economy model of
voting on poverty assistance could also bring our rational choice analysis closer to
the empirical evidence on policy preferences.
Support provided by the MTA Bolyai Scholarship is gratefully acknowledged. We
are indebted to Gabor Kezdi, Tim Krieger, Andras Simonovits, Adam Szeidl and
Daniel Varga for their comments on an earlier version of the paper.
www.economics-ejournal.org 9
conomics Discussion Paper
References
Albrekt Larsen, C. (2006). The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes. Ashgate.
Albrekt Larsen, C., and T.E. Dejgaard (2013 ). The Institutional Logic of Images
of the Poor and Welfare Recipients: A Comparative Study of British, Swedish
and Danish Newspapers. Journal of European Social Policy 23(3): 287-299.
Alesina, A. and G. Angeletos (2005). Fairness and Redistribution. American Eco-
nomic Review 95(4): 960-980.
Alesina, A. and E. Glaeser (2004). Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and in Europe: A
World of Difference. New York: Oxford University Press.
Besley, T., amd S. Coate (1992). Understanding welfare stigma: taxpayer resent-
ment and statistical discrimination. Journal of Public Economics 48(2): 165-183.
Cook, F. L. and E. J. Barrett (1992). Support for the American Welfare State.
Columbia University Press.
Croson, R. and J. Konow (2009). Social Preferences and Moral Biases. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 69(3): 201-212.
Dahlberg, M., K. Edmark, and H. Lundqvist (2012). Ethnic diversity and prefer-
ences for redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 120(1), 41-76.
Finseraas, H. (2009). Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: A Mul-
tilevel Analysis of European Public Opinion. Scandinavian Political Studies
32(1): 94-119.
Fong, C. (2001). Social Preferences, Self-interest, and the Demand for Redistribu-
tion. Journal of Public Economics 82: 225-246.
Freeman, G. P. (1986). Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485: 51-63.
Gilens, M. (1999). Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of
Anti-Poverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
www.economics-ejournal.org 10
conomics Discussion Paper
Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D.N. Posner, and J.M. Weinstein (2007). Why
does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political
Science Review 101(04): 709-725.
Iyengar, S. (1991). Is Anyone Responsible? Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Janky, B., B. Bako, P. Szilagyi, A. Bodnar (2014). Stigmatising the Poor Without
Negative Images: Images of Extreme Poverty and the Formation of Welfare
Attitudes. Sociological Research Online, 19(3),4.
Janky, B. and D. Varga (2013). The Poverty-assistance Patadox. Economics Letters
120(3): 447-449.
Lindqvist, E. and R. Ostling (2013). Identity and redistribution. Public Choice,
155(3-4), 469-491.
Luttmer, E. F. P. (2001). Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution. Journal
of Political Economy 109(3): 500-528.
Mau, S. and C. Burkhardt (2009). Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western
Europe, Journal of European Social Policy19(3): 213-229.
Petersen, M. B., R. Slothuus, R. Stubager and L. Togeby (2011). Deservingness ver-
sus Values in Public Opinion on Welfare: The Automaticity of the Deservingness
Heuristic. European Journal of Political Research 50(1). 24-52.
Soroka, S., K. G. Banting and R. Johnston (2006). Immigration and Redistri-
bution in a Global Era. In. P. Bardhan, S. Bowles and M. Wallerstein (eds):
Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Stichnoth, H. and K. Van der Straeten (2009). Ethnic Diversity and Attitudes
Towards Redistribution: A Review of the Literature. CEER ZEW Discussion
Paper No. 09-036.
www.economics-ejournal.org 11
conomics Discussion Paper
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2006). Is the Future American? Or, Can Left Politics Preserve Eu-
ropean Welfare States from Erosion through Growing Racial Diversity? Journal
of Social Policy 34: 661-672.
Van Oorschot, W. (2000). Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness
Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public. Policy & Politics
28(1): 33–48.
Weede, E. (1986). Sectoral Reallocation, Distributional Coalitions and the Welfare
State as Determinants of Economic Growth Rates in Industrialized Democracies.
European Journal of Political Research 14(5-6): 501–520.
www.economics-ejournal.org 12
conomics Discussion Paper
A Appendix
A.1 Optimal compensation level c∗
We assume that w = e+ f where e is a discrete variable, and its distribution is:
Pr(e= 0) = 1− p and Pr(e= h) = p; f is a continuous variable and its conditional
distribution is: f | e = 0v N(0,1), f | e = hv N(0,r) where 1 < r (we denote the
conditional distributions by f1 and fr , respectively). Then,
c∗ = (h− x)Pr(e = h | w = x)
= (h− x)Pr(e = h)Pr(w = x | e = h)
Pr(w = x)
= (h− x) Pr(e = h)Pr(h+ fr = x)
Pr(e = h)Pr(h+ fr = x)+Pr(e = 0)Pr( f1 = x)
(3)
Because of continuity of f and h being a constant we get:
c∗ = lim
ε→0
(h− x) Pr(e = h)Pr( fr ∈ [x−h,x−h+ ε])
Pr(e = h)Pr( fr ∈ [x−h,x−h+ ε])+Pr(e = 0)Pr( f1 ∈ [x,x+ ε])
= lim
ε→0
(h− x) p [Fr(x−h+ ε)−Fr(x−h)]
p [Fr(x−h+ ε)−Fr(x−h)]+(1− p) [F1(x+ ε)−F1(x)]
= (h− x) pΦr(x−h)
pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)
(4)
Note that
Φr(x−h) = 1√
2pir2
e−
(x−h)2
2r2 and Φ1(x) =
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2
where e stands for the base of natural logarithm.
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A.2 Marginal change of c∗ implied by changing x
∂c∗
∂x
=
∂
(
(h− x) pΦr(x−h)pΦr(x−h)+(1−p)Φ1(x)
)
∂x
=− pΦr(x−h)
pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)
+(h− x) pΦ
′
r(x−h) [pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]
[pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]2
− (h− x)
pΦr(x−h)
[
pΦ′r(x−h)+(1− p)Φ
′
1(x)
]
[pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]2
(5)
We know that
Φ
′
r(x−h) =−
x−h
r2
Φr(x−h) and
Φ
′
1(x) =−xΦ1(x)
Hence,
∂c∗
∂x
=
−pΦr(x−h)
pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x) +(h− x)
pΦr(x−h)(−x−hr2 ) [pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]
[pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]2
−(h− x)
pΦr(x−h)
[
pΦr(x−h)(−x−hr2 )+(1− p)Φ1(x)(−x)
]
[pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]2
=− pΦr(x−h)
[
r2 pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)
]
r2 [pΦr(x−h)+(1− p)Φ1(x)]2
(6)
Using the substitutions a =− (h−x)22r2 and b =−x
2
2 we get:
∂c∗
∂x
=
−pea
r2
[
pea+(1− p)eb]2
[
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)
]
(7)
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where e stands for the base of natural logarithm.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Based on (7) one can express the conditions for the poverty assistance paradox as
follows: ∂c
∗
i
∂x > 0 iff uv > 0, where
u =− pe
a
r2
[
pea+(1− p)eb]2 , and v = r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)
One should see immediately that u < 0 for any 0 < p < 1 and 1 < r, and for
any values of x and h. Hence, iff v < 0, then the poverty-assistance paradox exists.
That is, iff
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)< 0 (8)
then Proposition 1 holds. Rearranging (8), we get
r2 pea+(1− p)ebr2(1+ x)< (1− p)eb(x−h)2
p
1− pe
a−b+(1+ x)<
(x−h)2
r2
(9)
Recall, that a = − (h−x)22r2 and b = −x
2
2 . Hence, one can always find a low
enough value of r > 1 for which a < b holds, that is ea−b < 1. In addition, if p is
close enough to 0, the first term in (9) becomes an arbitrarily small number. In this
case, we only need
1+ x <
(x−h)2
r2
(10)
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which will always be true if x < −1. But there exists a low enough value of
r > 1 and −1 < x < 1 for which (10) also holds if
0 < h < x− r√1+ x
r
√
1+ x < x
(11)
That is, one can always find a small enough x relative to h and low enough
values of p > 0 and r > 1, for which (9) holds and thus, the poverty assistance
paradox emerges.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
To see this, let us rearrange (9) in the following way:
p
1− pe
a−b <
(x−h)2
r2
−1− x (12)
By continuity, it is self-evident, that for any 0 < p < 1, one can find a large
negative number x = w, and a value r close enough to 1, for which (12) and thus,
(9) are satisfied, so Corollary 1 holds.
A.5 Marginal change of c∗ implied by changing x and p
First, let us present ∂c
∗
i
∂ pi
as follows:
∂c∗i
∂ p
= rea+b
h− x
(pea+(1− p)reb)2 (13)
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Where again a =− (h−x)22r2 and b =−x
2
2 . One can easily see that compensation
is increasing in p if x < h. However, the question remains how the size of the
impact of p on c∗i depends on x.
∂c∗
∂x∂ p
=
∂
(
−pea
r2[pea+(1−p)eb]2
[
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)])
∂ p
=− e
a
r2
(
pea+(1− p)eb)3
(
−pea+(1+ p)eb
)[
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)
]
+
(
ear2− eb
[
r2(1+ x)− (h− x)2
]) −pea
r2
[
pea+(1− p)eb]2
(14)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
As ea,eb, p are all positive, for ∂c
∗
∂x∂ p < 0 we need
(
−pea+(1+ p)eb
)[
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)
]
> 0 (15)
and
ear2− eb
[
r2(1+ x)− (h− x)2
]
> 0 (16)
(15) is positive if:
r2 pea+(1− p)eb(r2− (x−h)2+ xr2)> 0
p
1− pe
a−b+(1+ x)>
(x−h)2
r2
and
(17)
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−pea+(1+ p)eb > 0
p
1+ p
< eb−a
(18)
Note that (17) is the reverse of (9). Hence, one can always find a high enough
value of r > 1 for which a > b holds, that is ea−b > 1. In addition, if p is close
enough to 1, the first term in (17) can become an increasinly large number. Besides
(17), we also need the first term of (15) to be positive:
Similarly to (17), for (18) to hold we need again p values close enough to 1
and high enough values of r > 1.
For (16) to be positive we need:
ear2 > eb
[
r2(1+ x)− (h− x)2
]
(19)
(19) always holds if
0 > eb
[
r2(1+ x)− (h− x)2
]
1+ x >
(x−h)2
r2
(20)
Note that (20) is the reverse of (10).
That is, one can always find an x close enough to h and high enough values of
p > 0 and r > 1, for which (15) and (16) holds and thus, the positive stereotype
interaction emerges.
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